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v. : 
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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an Order of the Fourth District Court 
setting the amount of child support for minor child David Charles 
Bowcutt. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(i) (1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the Appellant fail to preserve the issue of 
Guardianship, by never requested a ruling on the issue, and, 
additionally, informing the Court that the issue of Guardianship 
was "moot" at the Evidentiary Hearing held on March 18, 1994, (T. 
14), and by only now attempting to resurrect and challenge the 
issue (essentially) for the first time on appeal? 
This Court will not review issues that are raised for the 
first time on appeal. State in re Schreuder, 649 P. 2d 19, 22 
(Utah 1982). 
2. Did the Appellant fail to preserve the issue of 
jurisdiction, by failing to file any sport of appeal of challenge 
to the Ruling On The Order To Show Cause, held November 4, 1993, 
which addressed the issue of jurisdiction, by later accepting the 
Ruling issued November 24, 1993, regarding jurisdiction, and then, 
on or about January 18, 1994, by making a Request for Full 
Evidentiary Hearing, and attending the Hearing with his counsel, 
and never, at any time since the November 4, 1993 Order To Show 
Cause, raising the issue of jurisdiction, and only now raising the 
issue for the first time on appeal? 
This Court will not review issues that are raised for the 
first time on appeal. State in re Schreuder, 649 P. 2d 19, 22 
(Utah 1982). 
3. Did the Appellant fail to preserve the issue of Setting 
Aside Order Appointing Guardian, by failing to bring his Motion For 
Order To Show Cause To Set Aside Order Appointing Guardian and 
Conservator (filed on December 13, 1993), by either scheduling a 
hearing on the matter or filing a Notice To Submit For Decision, 
pursuant to Rule 4-501 (l)(d) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, while at the same time failing to voice an 
objection to jurisdiction at any subsequent hearings held Before 
Judge Hansen, and only now attempting to raise the issue for the 
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first time on appeal? ( In addition, counsel for Appellant declared 
the issue of Guardianship "moot" at the Evidentiary Hearing held on 
March 18, 1994, (T. page 14)) 
This Court will not review issues that are raised for the 
first time on appeal* State in re Schreuder, 649 P. 2d 19, 22 
(Utah 1982) . 
4. Does Utah Code Ann., § 78-45-7.5(8) (b) even apply to the 
facts of this matter concerning the social security survivorship 
benefits, and if so, does it require fmandate) the trial court to 
"offset" the Social Security benefits received by the minor child 
against the obligor Appellant's obligation, and, even if it is 
permissible to do so, does Judge Hansen's Ruling amount to a 
manifest injustice or inequity so much so that there exists 
evidence of clear abuse of Judge Hansen's discretion? 
The Court will presume the correctness of the trial court's 
decision absent "manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a 
clear abuse of . . . discretion." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d at 
1056, 1055 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Turner v. Turner. 649 P.2d 6, 
8 (Utah 1982)); see also Whitehead v. Whitehead, No. 910205-CA, 
slip op. at 3 (Utah App. Aug. 7, 1992). 
5. Does the Appellants' own failure to convince the judge 
through marshalling the evidence in support his position (with 
testimony or evidence regarding his contention that he has more 
than "one full-time" job), or that the monthly income figure should 
be other than that ultimately considered by the Court, when he had 
the opportunity to do so once having raised the issue, amount to 
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error by the Court such that the issue should be retried or the 
holding invalidated; and even if the circumstances might be 
characterized to constitute nominal error, did Judge Hansen's 
Ruling amount to a manifest injustice or inequity, that amounts to 
a clear abuse of Judge Hansen's discretion. 
The Court will presume the correctness of the trial court's 
decision absent "manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a 
clear abuse of . . . discretion." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P. 2d at 
1056, 1055 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 
8 (Utah 1982)); see also Whitehead v. Whitehead, No. 910205-CA, 
slip op. at 3 (Utah App. Aug. 7, 1992). 
6. Does Utah Code Ann § 78-45-7.5 (4)(a) enable the Appellant 
to avoid the admission (under penalty of perjury) in his tax 
returns that he has a taxable income of $7000 per month, and then 
subtract tax and student loan payments from his declared taxable 
income, and even if he might be allowed this double standard, does 
the denial of such deductions by the trial court, amount to a 
manifest injustice or inequity so much so that there was a clear 
abuse of Judge Hansen's discretion? 
The Court will presume the correctness of the trial court's 
decision absent "manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a 
clear abuse of . . . discretion." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d at 
1056, 1055 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Turner v. Turner. 649 P.2d 6, 
8 (Utah 1982)); see also Whitehead v. Whitehead, No. 910205-CA, 
slip op. at 3 (Utah App. Aug. 7, 1992). 
7. Does the fact that the Appellant provided no information 
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other than that by the testimony of the Appellant's spouse 
regarding the fact that there were two children born as issue of 
the Appellant's current marriage (T. 49), when he had opportunity 
to present additional information as to any additional children, 
constitute (in the face of res judicata) grounds for this Court to 
invalidate the ruling or reopen the issue, and even if so, does 
Judge Hansen's Ruling amount to a manifest injustice or inequity 
that amounts to a clear abuse of Judge Hansen's discretion. 
The Court will presume the correctness of the trial court's 
decision absent "manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a 
clear abuse of . . . discretion." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d at 
1056, 1055 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 
8 (Utah 1982)); see also Whitehead v. Whitehead, No. 910205-CA, 
slip op. at 3 (Utah App. Aug. 7, 1992). 
8. Was the Appellant under a continuing obligation to pay 
child support when the custodial parent died and the minor child 
did not reside, with the Appellant, and if so, was the award of 
child support, retroactive to the death of the custodial parent, a 
manifest injustice or clear abuse of discretion? 
The Court will presume the correctness of the trial court's 
decision absent "manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a 
clear abuse of . . . discretion." Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d at 
1056, 1055 (Utah App; 1987) (citing Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 
8 (Utah 1982)); see also Whitehead v. Whitehead, No. 910205-CA, 
slip op. at 3 (Utah App. Aug. 7, 1992). 
9. Did Judge Hansen have the jurisdiction and discretional 
5 
authority to award attorney's fees and costs, and if so, was the 
award of attorney's fees an abuse of this discretion? 
The Court will presume the correctness of the trial court's 
decision and review the issue of the award of attorney's fees on an 
abuse of discretion standard. Morgan v. Morgan
 r 795 P. 2d 684, 676-
88 (Utah App. 1990) . 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-202.5 (1985) 
(1) The parent of an unemancipated minor may appoint a 
guardian by written instrument designating the 
guardian. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-203 (1985) 
Any person interested in the welfare of a minor, or a 
minor of 14 years or older, may file with the court in 
which the will is probated or the written instrument is 
filed a written objection to the appointment before it is 
accepted or within 30 days after notice of its 
acceptance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-204 (1985) 
The court may appoint a guardian for an unemancipated 
minor if all parental rights of custody have been 
terminated or suspended by circumstances or prior court 
order. A guardian appointed by will under § 75-5-202, or 
by written instrument under §75-5-202.5, whose 
appointment has not been prevented or nullified under 
§75-5-203 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-45a-2 (Supp. 1994) 
(2) If paternity has been determined or has been 
acknowledged according to the laws of this state or any 
other state, the liabilities of the father may be 
enforced in the same or other proceedings... 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3 (1987) 
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The father's liability for past education and necessary 
support are limited to a period of four years next 
preceding the commencement of an action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.2 (1979) 
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the natural 
parent or adoptive parent of the primary obligation of 
support; furthermore, a stepparent has the same right to 
recover support for a stepchild from the natural or 
adoptive parent as any other obligee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(1)(b) (1994) 
(gross income includes) (b) income from salaries, wages, 
commissions royalties, bonuses, rents 
Utah Code Ann., § 78-45-7.5(8)(b) (1994) 
Social Security benefits received by a child due to the 
earnings of a parent may be credited as child support to 
the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by 
crediting the amount against the potential obligation of 
that parent. 
Utah Code § 78-45-7.5(7)(d) (1994) 
Income may not be imputed if any of the following 
conditions exist" ..(ii) a parent is physically or 
mentally disabled to the extent that he cannot earn 
minimum wage. 
Utah Code Ann § 78-45-7.5 (4)(a) (1994) 
Gross income from self-employment or operation of a small 
business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary 
expense required for self-employment or business 
operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment Only those e expenses 
necessary to allow the business to operate at a 
reasonable level may be deducted from gross receipts. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.6 (1) (1989) 
As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross income" 
is the amount calculated by subtracting from gross income 
alimony previously ordered and paid and child support 
previously ordered. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant is the natural father of the minor child David 
Bowcutt. The Appellant appeals from an Order On Ruling: Child 
Support. 
A hearing was held before Judge Steven Hansen on March 18, 
1994 in the Fourth District Court, for the purpose of determining 
the amount of child support that Appellant should pay for the 
support of the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt. On April 5, 
1994, Judge Hansen issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
The Order regarding the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was 
signed the 13th day of May, 1994, and is the subject of this 
appeal. The Order denied the Defendant's request for an offset of 
the Social Security Benefits received by the minor child, David 
Bowcutt, set the amount of child support the Appellant is to pay, 
entered a judgment for past due child support, ordered an 
accounting and that Appellant should pay attorneys' fees in the 
amount of $1,000.00 and costs in the amount of $105.00. 
Appellant filed a notice of Appeal on June 10, 1994. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. David Charles Bowcutt is a minor child, whose mother, Janet 
Sue Bowcutt, is deceased and whose father is the Appellant, Don 
Leslie Bowcutt. 
2. The minor child's parents were divorced prior to the death 
of Janet Sue Bowcutt. 
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3. On or about October 27, 1993, an Order to Show Cause was 
filed in Fourth District Court by Helen Jensen, Guardian and 
Conservator of the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, regarding 
the issue of child support. 
4. On or about October 29, 1993 Appellant, through his 
counsel, Robert Moody, filed a Motion to Dismiss along with a 
Memorandum in Support of Motion To Dismiss. 
5. On or about November 3, 1993, Helen Jensen filed a Response 
to Motion To Dismiss Order To Show Cause. 
4. On November 4, 1993 an Order To Show Cause hearing was held 
before Judge Steven Hansen, regarding the issues of jurisdiction, 
child support arrearages and the issue of on-going support. 
5. The Appellant was represented by attorney Robert Moody. 
6. Following the arguments from counsel at the Order To Show 
Cause Hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement and on 
November 24, 1993, the honorable Judge Steven L. Hansen, issued a 
Ruling regarding the issues of on-going child support, and 
jurisdiction, and arrearages. 
7. On November 24, 1993, the Court found that the Appellant 
had an on-going support obligation to the minor child. 
8. On November 24, 1993, the Court found that minor child, 
David Charles Bowcutt, did have standing to maintain an action 
against his natural father for support, via a Guardian Ad Litemf 
and Ron Wilkinson, was appointed as Guardian Ad Litem. 
9. On November 24, 1993, with regard to jurisdiction, the 
court found that the court has continuing jurisdiction to make an 
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award of child support, pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-5(3). 
10. The court ordered a special review hearing to "determine 
the status and needs of the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, as 
well as Defendant's [Appellant's] current income level." (See 
Exhibit 1, point # 7 ) . 
11. No appeal was filed regarding the November 24, 1993, 
Ruling of the Trial Court on the Order To Show Cause held on 
November 4, 1993, which included Findings of Fact, and Conclusions 
of Law on the issues of jurisdiction and child support obligations. 
12. On December 23, 1993, the hearing was held before Judge 
Hansen, regarding the status of the case and the Appellant's 
financial status for purposes of establishing the amount of child 
support. Appearing at the hearing held December 23, 1993, the 
Appellant's counsel made a reguest for an Evidentiary Hearing, 
regarding only the amount of the child support, not whether there 
should be child support. 
13. No appeal was filed regarding the court's decision to 
conduct an Evidentiary Hearing to establish the amount of child 
support obligation of the Appellant. 
14. On March 21, 1994, an Evidentiary Hearing was held, 
regarding the sole issue of the amount of Appellants child support 
obligation for the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt. 
15. The minor child was not present in court, but was 
represented by his Guardian Ad Litem, Ron Wilkinson. 
16. The minor child's maternal grandmother, and Guardian and 
Conservator, Helen Jensen, was also present, with her counsel, 
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Rosemond Blakelock. 
17. The Trial Court, at the Evidentiary Hearing, heard 
argument and testimony regarding the Appellant's ability to provide 
support for the minor child, David Bowcutt, and the said minor 
child's need for on-going support. 
18. The Appellant's counsel, Robert Moody informed the trial 
court, on March 18, 1994, that (the two cases were agreeably 
consolidated) and the issue of Guardianship was "moot" and did not 
proceed to address the issue any further. 
19. The Trial Court then took the matter of the amount of 
child support under advisement, and on or about April 5, 1994, made 
a Ruling, issuing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
concerning the amount of child support to be assessed. 
20. The issue of the custodial status of the minor child, was 
never brought before the trial court, either at the Order To Show 
Cause, held on November 4, 1994, the subsequent hearing held 
December 23, 1993, or the Evidentiary Hearing held March 18, 1994. 
21. Appellant, either personally or through counsel, made a 
general appearance at all hearings, provided testimony to the 
court regarding his opinion as to the monthly expenses and needs of 
his minor child, David Bowcutt, and in all other matters submitted 
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court, without objection. 
22. On the 24th day of December, 1993, the 30-day appeal 
period on the November 24, 1993 Ruling (Findings and Conclusions) 
concerning jurisdiction and the obligation (not amount), ran out. 
23. On the 27th day of January, 1994 (allowing for a few 
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holidays) the 30-day appeal period on the December 23, 1993 Ruling, 
ran out. 
24. On the 13th day of May, 1994, Judge Hansen issued the 
Ruling establishing the amount of the child support, from which 
Ruling the Appellant appeals. 
25. Appellant filed the notice of appeal on or about the 10th 
of June, 1994. 
26. It is the child's right to support that is at the heart of 
this matter, and neither the Notice of Appeal, nor the Docketing 
Statement, nor the Request for Summary Disposition were mailed to, 
or served upon, the Guardian Ad Litem (legal counsel) for the minor 
child. See the mailing Certificates to the Notice of Appeal, 
Docketing Statement and the Request for Summary Disposition, on 
file with this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Several of Appellants' claims were waived either by failure to 
assert them at or before the Evidentiary Hearing or by failure to 
adequately address them on appeal. These include: 
1. Appellant's claims regarding Guardianship and 
application of Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-204; 
2. Appellant's claim that jurisdiction is an issue; 
3. Appellant's claim that it is appropriate to now rule 
on the Motion To Set Aside Order Appointing Guardian. 
The section of the Utah Probate Code that Appellant claims 
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should have been followed by the lower court, §75-5-204, was never 
raised as an issue at the Evidentiary Hearing. In addition, 
counsel for the Appellant stated to the Honorable Judge Hansen that 
the matter of guardianship was "moot", thus waiving any additional 
claims. (T. 14). 
Even if § 75-5-204 should have been followed, the Appellant 
has misread and misapplied the applicable sections. 
Appellant failed to marshal any evidence supporting his 
contention that this court should ignore long-established 
procedural law against making a ruling on appeal, on any issue that 
has never been contested or raised in the lower court. Further, 
Appellant asks this court to overrule a decision that has never 
been made — a procedural impossibility. 
The remaining issues raised by Appellant are unsupported by 
any argument or case law supporting his position, or reaching the 
procedural standard of demonstrating that there was an abuse of 
judicial discretion. The standard of review was not even addressed 
by Appellant. 
Once the Appellant agreed and stipulated to the Appointment of 
the Guardian Ad Litem, (T. 14), stipulated to the consolidation of 
all matters, (T. 3), and stipulated that the only remaining issue 
was the determination of the amount of the amount of child support 
(based upon the status and needs of the minor child, and the 
Defendant's income (T. 3), the only legitimate issues which may 
even be considered on appeal would be those contested and addressed 
at the Evidentiary Hearing. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
APPELLANT WAIVED SEVERAL OF THE ISSUES 
RAISED IN HIS BRIEF, BY FAILING TO RAISE 
THEM BELOW OR BY FAILING TO SUPPORT THEM 
WITH SUFFICIENT LEGAL ANALYSIS ON APPEAL 
Appellant asserts claims in his Statement of Issues and 
Statement of Facts that were not raised in the Evidentiary Hearing 
held on March 18, 1994. Further, some of these issues are not 
clearly briefed in the Argument portion of Appellants7 brief. 
However, to the extent that the issues are nominally raised, this 
Court should not consider them. Other claims are simply 
unsupported by sufficient citations to relevant authority or legal 
analysis. 
A. Claims Regarding Application of Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-204 
First, Appellant appears to assert that Utah Code Ann § 75-5-
204 (1985), applies because the Appellant's parental rights have 
not been terminated. The Appellant either failed to read the 
entire statute, or failed to understand the statute. Clearly, this 
statute does provide that the court may appoint a guardian for an 
unemancipated minor "if" all parental rights of custody have been 
terminated. However, the parental rights of the Appellant were not 
ever an issue before the court, and so this particular section of 
the guardianship statute does not apply at all. In addition, 
Appellant failed to cite to the entire statute, omitting the (more 
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applicable) second half of the sentence in Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-
204 (1985), the statute reads as follows: 
The court may appoint a guardian for an unemancipated 
minor if all parental rights of custody have been 
terminated or suspended by circumstances or prior court 
order. A guardian appointed by will under § 75-5-202, or 
by written instrument under §75-5-202.5, whose 
appointment has not been prevented or nullified under 
§75-5-203 
The testimony at the Evidentiary Hearing from the Appellant 
was that the minor child refused to live with the Appellant. (T 55, 
"He won't stay with me"). Had the issue been challenged and heard 
as a contested issue at the Evidentiary Hearing, the Appellant's 
own testimony was that the physical custody of the minor child was, 
at a minimum, "suspended." 
However, the purpose of the Evidentiary Hearing (which is the 
subject of this instant appeal) was solely for the purpose os 
setting the amount of child support, and the issue of guardianship 
was not addressed. 
Second, The Guardian was appointed under Utah Code Ann. § 75-
5-202.5, which permits appointment of a Guardian in instances where 
the parental rights have not been terminated. Appellant received 
notification of the Guardianship Hearing, was in fact present in 
the Probate courtroom, and voiced no timely objection to the 
appointment. 
Third, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-203 the Appellant, 
following the hearing, filed an objection in the form of his 
Motion, although it was not timely. This Motion was itself 
rendered moot when the Appellant by, and through, his counsel of 
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record, Robert Moody, accepted the Appointment of the Guardianship, 
in open court, at the Evidentiary Hearing (T 14). 
B. Claims regarding November 24, 1993 Ruling. 
Issue two (2) of the Appellants7 Statement of Issues (App. Br. 
at 2) asserts that the Trial Court erred in proceeding under the 
parties' original divorce action and asserts that there was no 
jurisdiction. (The issue is discussed in Issue Two of the 
Appellant's Brief on the issue of whether or not the November 24, 
1993 Ruling was in error. App. Br. at 15-17). 
To begin with, it is well established law that jurisdiction 
must be addressed at the initial stages of a proceeding, and must 
be considered waived when the parties appear, and especially, as 
here, when they appear at a succession of hearings, and file a 
succession of pleadings — none of which raised the jurisdictional 
challenge. 
Appellant did not file an objection to the Ruling of the Trial 
Court on November 24, 1993, nor did he file an appeal of the Ruling 
with the Appeals Court. Neither did the Appellant object to the 
November 24, 1993 Ruling at the Evidentiary Hearing. In fact, the 
Appellant himself evidenced his acceptance of the Court's subject 
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. For example, 
Appellant personally appeared at the evidentiary Hearing on March 
18, 1994, with his counsel (thus waiving any right to object to 
personal jurisdiction), and asked the court to consolidate all 
matters under one case number, (T. 3, the court accepted the 
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Stipulation of all parties to consolidate the pending matters, 
resolving or waiving any challenge to subject matter jurisdiction). 
The court stated that the "fundamental issue", and purpose of the 
hearing was solely to determine the "status and needs of David 
Charles Bowcutt" (T 3). 
Thus, while the trial court may or may not have lost it's 
jurisdiction, that jurisdictional issue became moot when the 
Appellant appeared, accepted jurisdiction of the court, and thus 
waived his right to raise jurisdictional issues. 
For example Appellant's counsel elicited testimony from the 
Appellant regarding whether or not Appellant felt that he should 
support the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, to which the 
Appellant answered "Yes, I think someone needs to support him" (T 
54). Thus, the Appellant, through his own testimony and appearance 
on the witness stand, accepted jurisdiction, the consolidation of 
the case, and the process of proceeding under the original decree. 
This court cannot decide an issue which was not challenged 
before the trial court, but is being challenged for the first time, 
on appeal. State in re Schreuder, 649 P. 2d 19, 22 (Utah 1982). 
C. Claims Regarding the Motion To Set Aside Order Appointing 
guardian and Conservator 
Issue three (3) of the Appellants Statement of Issues, is a 
restatement of Issue one. However, because it is two separate 
issues in the Appellant's brief, it will, again be addressed. 
Not only did the Appellant fail to follow the appropriate 
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procedures regarding his Motion To Set Aside Order Appointing 
Guardian and Conservator, counsel for the Appellant withdrew any 
chance of having the matter heard by the trial court, when he (Mr. 
Moody) stated to the court, at the Evidentiary Hearing held March 
18, 1994: "Now, We've consolidated the guardianship matter, your 
Honor. We had some problem with that appointment because of 
certain thing, but I think that now becomes moot because the Court 
has appointed a Guardian Ad Litem" (T 14). The court did not 
address the issue of Guardianship, or the Motion To Set Aside Order 
Appointing Guardianship any further, because counsel for Appellant 
stated that they believed the matter to be moot. Appellant cannot 
now on appeal challenge a matter conceded at the trial court. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANTS7 ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE LOWER COURT'S 
CONSIDERATION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY FUNDS IS WITHOUT 
LEGAL ANALYSIS OR EVIDENCE OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
The discussion of Issue Four (4) of the Appellant's Brief, is 
based upon the assumption that the Appellants obligation should be 
reduced by the survivorship benefits received by the child as a 
result of his mother's death, or that the minor child's deceased 
mother should contribute somehow to the support of the minor child. 
(App. Br. at 20). 
Pursuant to the Utah Code Ann.§ 78-45-7.5(8)(b): 
Social Security benefits received by a child due to the 
earnings of a parent may be credited as child support to 
the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by 
crediting the amount against the potential obligation of 
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that parent. 
To begin with, the Appellant mis-interprets or misapplies this 
statute. This statute might allow the obligor a credit for social 
security benefits received by the child or other spouse, if the 
benefits were generated by the obligor's work history or actions. 
But in this case, the benefits are survivorship benefits, created 
by and related to the mother's death, not the obligor's actions. 
Further, Appellant cites no authority for his bald assertion 
that the deceased mother should have imputed to her as income the 
child's Social Security survivorship benefits, or that she should 
have imputed income at all. 
Even if the benefits might be used as imputed income, the 
obvious question is how much income should be imputed to the minor 
child's deceased mother? 
Appellant suggests an outlandish formula wherein he would 
require the court to impute to the deceased party a certain income. 
Appellant failed to address the fact that pursuant to Utah Code § 
78-45-7.5(7)(d) "Income may not be imputed if any of the following 
conditions exist" ..(ii) a parent is physically or mentally 
disabled to the extent that he cannot earn minimum wage." 
It seems equally outlandish to have to state that death certainly 
constitutes a physical disability which is going to keep the minor 
child's mother from having a wage imputed to her, much less the 
$1,750.00 per month salary that Appellant requests. (App. Br at 
20). Such absurd rhetoric is yet another ruse for the Appellant to 
avoid paying child support, by having his child support reduced. 
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The Appellant failed to present any authority for his personal 
application of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (8)(b). Appellant's 
failure to support his bare assertions with authority and analysis 
should also result in this Court refusing to consider the issue. 
State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (1984). 
In addition to the Appellant's failure to state the legal 
basis for his contentions, he fails to state the basis for 
overruling the decision of the lower court. Due to the equitable 
nature of child support proceedings, the Court of Appeals accords 
substantial deference to the trial court's findings and gives the 
trial court considerable latitude in fashioning child support 
orders. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P. 2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985); Hill 
v. Hill. 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah App. 1992). Absent an abuse of 
discretion, the Appeals Court "will not disturb the trial court's 
actions." Hill. 841 P.2d at 724. 
Appellant cites to "common sense" as the basis of his 
arguments, without citing one case, or statute to support his 
contentions, (App. Br. at 20) and offers his preferred solution. 
However, the standard of review is whether the Court abused its 
discretion. The Appellant not only failed to marshal any evidence 
of abuse of discretion, he also failed to acknowledge that it was 
the Appellant himself who requested the court not consider the 
guidelines at all in coming to a decision. (T 25) It takes little 
more than common sense to come to the conclusion that even if the 
Court strayed from the guidelines in reaching a conclusion, it did 
so at the insistence of the Appellant, and the Appellant, of all 
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people, cannot now cry "foul" of the result. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT CITED NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS CONTENTION 
THAT HIS TOTAL INCOME SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED 
Available evidence indicates that the Appellant, through his 
counsel, Robert Moody, supplied the court with the information 
upon which the lower court made it's findings and conclusions. For 
example, Mr. Moody informed the court that the [child support] 
Guidelines are "only advisory" (T. 72), and further informed the 
court that the Appellant earns "$83,000 a year" (T. 75). Further, 
it was Appellant's counsel that proposed to the court that, for 
purposes of calculating child support, the Appellant should be 
considered to earn $7,000 per month. The court listened to 
proffered evidence from all counsel present, including counsel for 
Appellant. Counsel for Appellant did not deny that the Appellant 
worked the equivalent of one full time job, and in fact, provided 
the figures and information to the court, to which he now objects! 
(T. 71-72). 
The income information provided to the lower by Appellant7s 
attorney, Robert Moody, was clear regarding the probable earning 
potential ($84,000 per year) his education and training 
(physician). Given Appellant's failure to provide any other 
information to the lower court, and in light of the fact that the 
Ruling of the lower court used the figures provided by Appellant, 
there does not appear to be an error in the court's determination 
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of Appellant's income. 
The Appellant makes arguments and provides "testimony11 in his 
brief, that were never, considered or made available to, the lower 
court. Appellant's contentions that he works "extensive weekend 
and after hour on-call obligations" was not introduced at the lower 
court, and is now prohibited from making new arguments. (App. Br. 
at 21). 
The Appellant states that he "insists that it is not up to the 
Court's discretion to decide whether a second job will be included 
in the determination of gross income". (App. Br. at 21) However, 
the Appellant fails to marshal the evidence or cite to statute or 
case law to support such a contention. In addition - it was 
Appellant's counsel who informed the lower court that the 
guidelines were advisory. 
Appellant's failure to support his bare assertions with 
authority and analysis should also result in this Court refusing to 
consider the issue. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (1984). 
In addition, the standard of review for such matters is one of 
abuse of discretion. In cases where the Court of Appeals accords 
substantial deference to the trial court's findings and gives the 
trial court considerable latitude in fashioning child support 
orders, the court will look at the evidence available to the lower 
court. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985); Hill 
v. Hill. 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah App. 1992). Absent an abuse of 
discretion, the Appeals Court "will not disturb the trial court's 
actions." Hill. 841 P.2d at 724. 
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In this case, it was the Appellant, through his counsel, Mr. 
Robert Moody, who supplied to the court the information and made 
the suggestion that the lower court consider the Appellant to earn 
"$7,000.00 per month for the purposes of child support". 
Appellant puts forth the argument in his Brief that the 
worksheet (used to figure child support) "is only a guideline to be 
followed by the court at its own discretion" (App. Br. at page 22), 
and that the guidelines should not be used at all (T 25). These 
two statements fly in the face if his arguments regarding the 
appropriate application of the guidelines. Try as he might to argue 
otherwise, no court should allow him to have it both ways. 
Traditionally, the court accords the trial court considerable 
discretion to the lower court and thus, the lower court's "actions 
are entitled to a presumption of validity." Allred v. Allredr 797 
P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 1990)(quoting Hansen v. Hansen. 736 P.2d 
1055, 1056 (Utah App. 1987)). In addition, the lower courts 
determination "will not be upset on appeal unless the evidence 
clearly preponderates to the contrary or [this court) determine[s] 
that the court has abused its discretion." Durfee v. Durfee, 796 
P.2d 713, 717 (Utah App. 1990)(quoting Ostler v. Ostler. 789 P.2d 
713, 715 (Utah App. 1990)). 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
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POINT IV 
UTAH CODE DOES NOT REQUIRE THE COURT TO 
SUBTRACT TAX AND MEDICAL LOAN PAYMENTS 
FROM GROSS INCOME, NOR ALLOW THEM, 
UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE DEDUCTED 
The Appellant's claim, in Issue six(6) that the lower court 
should have subtracted tax and student loan payments from his gross 
income is made without any reference to code or case authority, and 
without (virtually) any analysis. Such a failure should result in 
this Court refusing to consider the issue. State v. Amicone, 689 
P.2d 1341, 1344 (1984). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(1)(b) (1994), defines "gross 
income" as "income from salaries, wages, commissions". Even if the 
Appellant's claim that Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(4)(a) is 
applicable, it would not enable the Appellant to deduct tax and 
loan payments from his income. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(4) (a), 
states clearly that "Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from 
gross receipts". Appellant is attempting to deduct items 
specifically disallowed under the code and by the work sheets 
approved by the courts of this state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.6 (1), Adjusted Gross Income, states 
that adjusted gross income "...is the amount calculated by 
subtracting from gross income, alimony previously ordered and paid 
and child support previously ordered". No other deductions are 
allowed. 
Therefore, the claim made by the Appellant that credit for 
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tax and student loan payments should be given, has been made in bad 
faith, and without any basis in law. 
It is inappropriate, upon appeal, for the Appellant to insist 
upon the application of the guidelines, when it was counsel for the 
Appellant who requested that the court not use the Guidelines at 
all. (T at 24). Appellants7 counsel, Robert Moody, referred the 
court to Durfee v. Pur fee, 796 P. 2d 713 (Utah App. 1990) and stated 
as follows: 
Mr. Moody: We cant, your Honor (just use the guidelines 
and come up with a figure), because the guidelines are 
only advisory. They're not mandatory. I think the law 
the Court is searching for is Durfey versus Durfey, 
Pacific 2d. 796 
It's a case very similar where the mother died. In that 
situation the Court stated that the overview section of 
the guidelines indicate that final orders of the case 
shall be made at the discretion of the court based on 
the facts of the individual case. 
It went on and talked about the duty of the father to 
furnish the necessaries. The trial court should take 
into consideration what the needs of the child are. 
Based upon the needs and based upon the father's 
abilities, that what we should determine here. 
At that point, counsel for Appellant went even further when Robert 
Moody requested that the court not use the guidelines at all, when 
he proffered as follows: 
Mr. Moody: Well, my point is that we just don't go to the 
guidelines and say, "this is what it is." 
(T. 25) 
Following Mr. Moody's request that the Guidelines not be used, 
Helen Jensen, Guardian of the minor child, testified as to the 
needs of the minor child, and the fact that Helen Jensen was the 
sole source of support for the minor child, submitting to the Court 
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receipts and providing testimony as to the minor child's needs and 
generally providing testimony that Appellant had refused to 
voluntarily support the minor child. (T. 26-33) 
POINT V 
WHILE APPELLANT AND HIS CURRENT WIFE HAVE 
MAY A TOTAL OF THREE CHILDREN, THE TESTIMONY 
PROVIDED TO THE LOWER COURT WAS THAT THERE 
WERE ONLY TWO CHILDREN AS A PRODUCT OF THE 
APPELLANT'S CURRENT MARRIAGE 
While it was discussed in the Evidentiary Hearing that the 
Appellant and his current wife have three children in the home, the 
lower court gave the Appellant credit for two children from his 
current marriage, based upon the testimony of the Appellant's wife, 
Nora Bowcutt. 
Nora Bowcutt, was duly sworn and testified as follows: 
Mr. Moody: 
Q. Mrs. Bowcutt, tell us you name and your relationship to Dr. 
Don Bowcutt. 
A. My name is Nora Bowcutt and I'm Don Bowcutt's wife. 
Q. And how long have you been married to Dr. Bowcutt? 
A. Thirteen years. 
Q. How many children have been born as issue to that marriage? 
A. Two 
(T. 48-49) 
There was no other direct testimony regarding the number of 
children in the Appellant7s home. While there was some discussion 
stating the fact that there were other children in the home, 
(presumably Nora Bowcutt's by a previous marriage), the exact 
circumstances and situation was not made available to the lower 
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court. If there was an error and/or mistake of fact, it was not 
brought to the attention of the lower court. The lower court, 
based upon the testimony of Nora Bowcutt, gave the Appellant credit 
for two children in his home. 
There is no available evidence, or even a claim by Appellant, 
that the court abused it's discretion in allowing the Appellant 
credit for two children in the home. Indeed, the statute itself, is 
not mandatory, and the credit could have been denied completely. 
Given this legal fact, the exclusion of one child is irrelevant. 
In questions regarding the award of child support, the Court 
of Appeals accords substantial deference to the trial court's 
findings and gives the trial court considerable latitude in 
fashioning child support orders, the court will look at the 
evidence available to the lower court. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 
P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985); Hill v. Hill. 841 P.2d 722r 724 (Utah 
App, 1992). Absent an abuse of discretion, the Appeals Court "will 
not disturb the trial court's actions." Hill, 841 P.2d at 724. 
POINT VI 
IT WAS THE APPELLANT WHO ELIMINATED ALL ISSUES 
EXCEPTING THE APPROPRIATE AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT 
AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE APPELLANT'S INCOME 
The Appellant, through his counsel, Robert Moody, stipulated 
to the appointment of the Guardian Ad Litem, stating at the 
Evidentiary Hearing that the appointment was "appropriate and we 
think that it's helpful" (T at 14). The Appellant also stipulated 
to the consolidation of all pending matters (T. 3) thus waiving any 
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further jurisdictional objections. 
Appellant agreed to proceed in the Evidentiary Hearing on the 
matters set forth as the "fundamental" issue or reason for the 
hearing (being status and needs of minor David Bowcutt and the 
determination of the Appellants current income level). 
Although the Appellant had opportunity to raise other issues 
during the Evidentiary Hearing, he did not. 
Once the minor child's Guardian Ad Litem was appointed, the 
court proceeded under the consolidated cases, using the parties 
original divorce action as reference number, but stated clearly 
that the action could be maintained by the minor child, through his 
Guardian Ad Litem, and cited to Faver v. Hansen, 803 P. 2d 1275 
(Utah App. 1990). (See Addendum 1, Ruling April 5, 1993, page 2) 
At the Evidentiary Hearing, there was no objection to that 
decision, (to consolidate and proceed), because it was the 
Appellant's counsel who requested an Evidentiary Hearing and it 
was Appellant's counsel who filed the Motion To Consolidate. 
POINT VII 
THE APPELLANT WAS UNDER A CONTINUING OBLIGATION 
TO SUPPORT THE MINOR CHILD - EVEN IF HE DID NOT 
DO SO AFTER THE TIME THE CUSTODIAL PARENT DIED 
The question of retroactivity is applicable in a case where 
the minor child does not reside with the parent who is obligated to 
provide that minor child's support. 
It is clear that the minor child, has independent standing to 
request child support. Utah courts have long held that the right to 
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receive child support is an unalienable right, belonging to the 
child, and cannot be bartered away by the child's parent or 
parents. Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981); Hansen v. 
Gossett, 590 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1979) (right to support belongs 
to the child); State Division of Family Services v. Clark, 554 P.2d 
1310, 1311-12 (Utah 1976) (child support duty is continuing and 
right to receive it is unalienable); Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 
141, 143 (Utah 1974) (a father cannot divest himself of the 
obligation to support, nor defeat the child's right to support). 
The right to child support is a right of the children themselves. 
Hansen v. Gossettf 590 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1979), quoting Wasescha v. 
Wasescha, Utah, 548 P.2d 895 (1976); see also, Mason v. Mason. 148 
or. 34, 34 P.2d 328 (1934). 
The fact that one parent may not be under a current obligation 
to pay child support does not terminate that parent's 
responsibility to pay support in the future. Woodward v. Woodward, 
709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985). 
Thus, Appellant was obligated to support the minor child, no 
matter which case number was used. However, the consolidation of 
all matters, by stipulation, renders the question moot. 
In addition, to the case law cited above, the right of a child 
to receive support and to maintain an action for support is found 
in the Utah Code. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3 (1987) ("Every man 
shall support his child"); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.2 (1979) 
("Nothing contained (within the Uniform Civil Liability for Support 
Act] shall act to relieve the natural parent or adoptive parent of 
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the primary obligation of support"). 
More specifically, the Uniform Act on Paternity acknowledges 
the right of a child to maintain an action for paternity and for 
liabilities thereof, including the reasonable expenses of 
pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral 
expenses. Utah Code Ann.§ 78-45a-2 (Supp. 1994). 
The Appellant's reliance on Nielson v Nielson, 826 P.2d 1065, 
1067 (Utah App. 1991), is either naive7 or purposefully 
misrepresented to the court. The case (Nielson) was one where 
custody was at issue. Each parent was contending that the other 
was unfit. Custody (in Nielson) was awarded to the Plaintiff, 
Gregory Nielson. Defendant then filed a petition for modification 
(as to custody) and Plaintiff filed a counter petition. 
The custodial parent (Mr. Neilson) then died. 
Mr. Nielson's personal representative attempted to continue to 
litigate the issue of custody. The court stated clearly that "upon 
the death of the custodial parent, the right to custody of the 
children immediately vests in the noncustodial parent" Nielson v 
Nielson, 826 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1991). 
There is no issue of custody before the court and it has 
never, at any time been represented as an issue. Appellant's own 
testimony evidenced an acknowledgement that the minor child simply 
refuses to reside with the Appellant, when he stated "He [minor 
child David Bowcutt] won#t stay with me." (T. 55). 
The Appellant cannot acknowledge the fact that the minor child 
refuses to reside with him, (T. 55), and cannot stipulate to the 
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fact that he is obligated to support the minor child (T. 54) in the 
Evidentiary Hearing in the lower court, and then file an appeal 
claiming that he is somehow being denied custody, or that he has no 
obligation to support the minor child. Those contentions were 
resolved by agreement or waiver in the proceedings presented before 
the trial court, and cannot now be contested for the first time on 
appeal. This Court will not review issues that are raised for the 
first time on appeal. State in re Schreuder. 649 P. 2d 19, 22 
(Utah 1982). 
POINT VIII 
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS APPROPRIATE 
AND THE APPEALS COURT SHOULD AWARD ADDITIONAL 
FEES TO HELEN JENSEN 
The lower court awarded attorney7s fees in the amount of 
$1000.00 and costs in the amount of $105.00. The Appellant 
disputes the lower court's ability to award attorney's fees but did 
not cite any evidence indicating an abuse of discretion by the 
lower court in granting the award. The Appeals Court will presume 
the correctness of the trial court's decision and review the issue 
of the award of attorney's fees on an abuse of discretion standard. 
Morgan v. Morgan. 795 P.2d 684, 676-88 (Utah App. 1990). 
Appellant disputes the lower court's reliance on Lyngle v. 
Lyngle 831 PP.2d 1027 (Utah App. 1992), and cited instead to Tribe 
v. Tribe. 59 Utah 112, 202 P. 2d 213 (1921), and Stubner v. Stubner. 
121 Utah 632, 244 P. 2d 650 (1952). While the cases Appellant cites 
may have been applicable, they predate the current and better law,, 
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and ironically do not rebut the lower court's award of attorney7 
fees. 
Tribe speaks to one being compelled to bring proceedings 
against another. The Ruling by Judge Hansen, issued April 5, 1994, 
at point 9, awarded attorney's fees to Mrs. Jensen, and stated in 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that "Mrs. Jensen was 
forced to bring this Defendant before the court in order to obtain 
support for the minor child" (See Addendum, 1 , Ruling, dated April 
5, 1994.) Thus, if Tribe applies at all, it supports the award of 
fees by Judge Hansen. 
Stubner, stands for the award of attorneys fees when a party 
failed to live up the his agreement and forced legal action. Again 
this only supports the contentions of the Appellee that she is 
entitled to fees, and does not undermine the Findings of Fact or 
Conclusions of Law in the Ruling. 
The Appellant did not provide any evidence to indicate that 
the lower Courts reliance on Lyngle was an abuse of discretion. 
Pursuant to the terms set forth in Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P. 2d 1055, 
1056 (Utah App. 1987) Appellant had to show, given the particular 
facts of this case, the trial court's decision creates a "manifest 
injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of . 
discretion." No particularities were shown. 
Unless such a showing is made, the Appeals Court should not 
disturb the trial court's ruling that Mrs. Jensen was entitled to 
costs and attorney fees. 
Further, Appellee, pursuant to Rule 33, of the Utah Rules of 
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Appellate Procedure, asserts that the Appeals Court should assess 
damages and attorney's fees against the Appellant. The court may 
make such a determination under Rule 3 3 "where there is no basis 
for the argument presented and when the evidence or law is mis-
characterized and misstated". Eames v Eames, 735 P. 2d 395, 397 
(Utah App. 1987). 
In each and every one of the issues presented by the 
Appellant, the Appellant had no basis for the arguments presented, 
and/or the evidence or statute cited does not support the 
Appellant7s contentions. Appellant's entire Brief, failed to pass 
the test as follows: (Appellants7 issues in order) 
Issue One: (Guardianship) - Not capable of appeal, the issue 
was resolved by agreement prior to the entry of the Court's Order 
being appealed. 
Issue Two: Not capable of appeal. Appellant has argued that 
custody is or was at issue. He has it. Further, the issue was not 
challenged at the Evidentiary Hearing. Appellant stipulated to the 
consolidation of all issues at the Evidentiary Hearing. 
Issue Three: Not capable of appeal, the issue was resolved by 
agreement prior to the entry of the Court's Order being appealed. 
Issues Four, Five, Six, and Seven: not capable of appeal, they 
are all arguments regarding the enforcement of the guidelines. The 
Appellant's counsel, Robert Moody informed the lower court that 
Durfey applied and requested that the court not apply the 
guidelines, arguing that they are advisory in nature. He cannot cry 
"foul" for the trial Court's deviation from the guidelines. 
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Appellants' own Brief asserts that the trial court may operate "at 
its own discretion" as to child support. (App. Br. at 22). 
Issue Eight: Appellant cites to an inapplicable case Nielson, 
which is addressing the issue of custody (not an issue before the 
lower court), and does not cite to any statute or acknowledge any 
case law regarding a parent's legal obligation to support a minor 
child. 
Issue Nine: Attorney's Fees: Appellant's argument rambles and 
is almost incomprehensible. Ironically, the cases cited support the 
Appellee, not the Appellant. 
The Appellant had competent counsel at trial. This pro se 
appeal is a sham, calculated to create hardship on the Appellee, 
and used as a means of retribution as a quid pro quo for having to 
pay child support — it is a transparent attempt to force the 
Appellee to incur costs which equal or exceed the child support 
awarded. Appellant's appeal creates great financial hardship on 
Helen Jensen, and only serves to delay the receipt of (or eliminate 
the economic benefit of) child support for the minor child. Such 
tactics are unconscionable and should be discouraged. Should the 
Appeals Court not take steps to indicate to Appellant the 
inappropriateness of his behavior, he will likely litigate the 
matter until the minor child reaches his majority without having 
had the benefits of child support to which he is legally and 
morally entitled. 
Appellee has incurred more than $5,000.00 in fees and costs 
associated with fighting this frivolous appeal, and should be 
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awarded her fees and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, Helen Jensen respectfully 
requests that this Court 
i. Dismiss the Appeal summarily, or 
ii. Affirm the order of the District Court, Order On 
Ruling: Child Support, and in either case, 
iii. Award her fees and costs as incurred, in the minimum 
amount of $5,000.00. 
DATED this day of September, 1994 
L-J^s^mond Blakelc 
attorney for Helen Jensen, Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent were mailed to Don Leslie bowcutt, 1130 West State Road, 
Pleasant Grove Utah 84602, and to Ron Wilkinson, 1139 South Orem 
blvd, Orem, Utah 84057, this/Z^r^iay of September, 1994. 
j "y/Pt^ 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COtMrf ^ •">? 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH i.* 
JANET SUE BOWCUTT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON LESLIE BOWCUTT, 
Defendant. 
******** 
RULING 
CASE NUMBER: 784448131 
APRIL 5, 1994 
STEVEN L. HANSEN, JUDGE 
******** 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 18, 
1994 for an evidentiary hearing regarding the defendant's child 
support obligation for the parties7 minor child, David Charles 
Bowcutt. Helen Jensen, maternal grandmother, Guardian and 
Conservator for the minor child, David Charles Bowcutt, was 
present and represented by Rose Blakelock. Defendant was present 
and represented by Robert Moody. Ron Wilkinson, Guardian Ad 
Litem for David Charles Bowcutt, was also present. At that time, 
the Court heard discussion and testimony regarding defendant's 
ability to provide support for the minor child and the minor 
child's status and needs for support and took the matter under 
advisement. 
On December 23, 1993 attorneys Rose Blakelock, Robert Moody, 
John Musselman, and Ron Wilkerson appeared before Judge Steve L. 
Hansen for an Order To Show Cause hearing. At that time, the 
Court ordered that a child support order was to be in the file 
within thirty days and the order would be retroactive to the 
Petition To Modify. On or about January 18, 1994 defendant filed 
a Request For Full Evidentiary Hearing. On or about January 21, 
1994 defendant filed a Motion To Consolidate along with a 
Memorandum Of Points And Authorities. On January 27, 1994 an 
Order On Hearing was signed and entered by the Court. On or 
about February 3, 1994 Helen Jensen, Guardian and Conservator of 
David Charles Bowcutt, filed a Motion In Support Defendant's 
Motion To Consolidate and a Motion In Support Defendant's Request 
For Full Evidentiary Hearing, Request For Information On 
Defendant's Income, And Motion For Compliance With Court's Order 
Of December 3, 1993. On or about March 8, 1994 Helen Jensen, 
Guardian and Conservator of David Charles Bowcutt, filed a Notice 
To Submit and on March 18, 1994, Mrs. Jensen's counsel filed an 
Affidavit In Support Of Attorney's Fees. 
The Court, having reviewed the above documentation and the 
Court's tape record of the March 18, 1994 hearing, and upon being 
advised in the premises, now rules as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A Decree Of Divorce in the above-entitled matter was 
signed and entered on March 2, 1978, whereas plaintiff, Janet 
Bowcutt, was awarded custody of the parties' two minor children 
and defendant was ordered to pay child support in the amount of 
$75.00 per month per child. On August 3, 1982 the Court entered 
an Order, whereas defendant's child support obligation was 
increased to $125.00 per month per child. 
On or about June 11, 1992 the State of Utah, Department of 
Human Services filed a Petition To Modify on behalf of plaintiff, 
Janet Bowcutt. At that time the State of Utah sought to increase 
defendant's child support obligation from $125.00 per month to 
$763.00 pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.2(6). 
On February 5, 1993, Janet Bowcutt, plaintiff and custodial 
parent of David Charles Bowcutt, died due to suicide. On or 
about August 13, 1993, Helen Jensen, maternal grandmother of 
David Charles Bowcutt, filed a Verified Petition For Appointment 
Of Guardian And Conservator of David Charles Bowcutt and on 
September 3, 1993 Helen Jensen was appointed as David Charles 
Bowcutt's Guardian and Conservator by Judge Guy R. Burningham. 
This matter came before the Court on November 4, 1993 for an 
Order To Show Cause hearing brought by Helen Jensen, Guardian and 
Conservator of David Charles Bowcutt, who was seeking child 
support from the defendant on behalf of the minor child. The 
Court issued a Ruling on November 24, 1993, whereas the Court 
found that defendant did have an on-going support obligation to 
David Charles Bowcutt and ordered that defendant place $125.00 
per month in an interest bearing trust account pending final 
resolution of this matter, that the $6,653.00 child support 
arrearage previously reduced to judgement be collected by Janet 
Bowcutt Wing's personal representative pursuant to the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code, and that a special review hearing be set 
for the limited purpose of determining David Charles Bowcutt's 
status and needs as well determining the defendants present 
income. Additionally, the Court appointed Mr- Ron Wilkerson as 
David Charles Bowcutt's Guardian Ad Litem-
2. With regard to defendant's Motion To Consolidate filed 
on or about January 21, 1994, the Court agrees that all three 
cases, Civil Number 934402209, Civil Number 93400310, and Civil 
Number 784448131, in which child support for David Charles 
Bowcutt are at issue should be consolidated. The Court notes 
that it previously directed Mr. Ron Wilkerson in the Ruling 
issued November 24, 1993 to proceed on this matter under the 
parties7 original divorce action, Civil Number 784448131, based 
upon the Court's determination that modification of defendant's 
monthly child support obligation to David Charles Bowcutt would 
be retroactive to the date the State of Utah filed its Petition 
To Modify As Intervenor on June 11, 1992. For clarification 
purposes, the Court consolidates the other two cases into Civil 
Number 784448131. Counsel is directed to file all documents 
pertaining to this matter in Civil Number 784448131 pursuant to 
the Court's previous finding that based upon Utah Court of 
Appeals' decision in Faver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275 (Utah App. 
1990), David Charles Bowcutt, via his Guardian Ad Litem, does 
have standing to maintain an action against his natural father 
for support. 
3. With regard to a determination of defendant's present 
income, the Court finds that defendant is a physician who earned 
$62,257.26 from his medical practice in 1993 and also earned an 
additional $21,845.00 in 1993 from a contract with Utah County 
for the provision of medical services to the Utah County Jail for 
a total earnings of $84,102,26 in 1993. See 1993 Miscellaneous 
Income Forms of Dr. Don L. Bowcutt. 
Defendant maintains that pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.5(2), 
his earnings from his medical practice should be viewed as "one 
full-time job" to be used in calculating his child support 
obligation for David Bowcutt and that his earnings resulting from 
his contract with Utah County should be treated as over-time 
earnings and excluded from calculating gross income for purposes 
of determining child support. 
Helen Jensen, acting in her capacity as David Bowcutt's 
Guardian and Conservator, maintains that defendant, as a medical 
doctor is a professional and that all income resulting from his 
practice of medicine, regardless of where that practice occurs, 
should be utilized by the Court in calculating defendant's child 
support obligation to David. 
Pursuant to U.C.A §78-45-7(3), the Court in determining the 
appropriate amount of support, must consider all relevant 
factors, including but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; and 
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and obligee for the 
support of others. 
The Court, noting that defendant has completed his professional 
education and developed a medical practice subsequent to the 
August 3, 1982 Order which modified his support obligation to 
$125.00 per month per child, finds that defendant is engaged in a 
medical practice that includes providing his services as a 
physician to the Utah County Jail as well as his practice with 
Dr. Bell. The Court, in considering defendant's present income 
level, standard of living, and relative wealth as well as the low 
level of support that defendant has historically provided for 
this minor child, will elect to utilize all of defendant's 
earnings resulting from his practice of medicine in determining 
defendant's present income level. Therefore, the Court finds 
that defendant's average monthly gross income is $7,008.52 based 
upon his gross 1993 income of $84,102.26. ($62,257.26 Earnings 
From Medical Practice With Carl T. Bell, M.D. + $21,845.00 
Earnings From Utah County « $84,102.26 1993 Gross Income). 
($84,102.26 1993 Gross Income -s- 12. = $7,008.52 Average Gross 
Monthly Income). 
4. With regard to the issue of the needs and status of the 
minor child, David Bowcutt, the Court heard testimony from Mrs. 
Jensen at the March 18, 1994 hearing as to actual expenses she 
has incurred for the care and support of David. It is 
uncontroverted that David has resided with other third parties, 
specifically the Tom Prentice family and his sister, Wendy, as 
well as Mrs. Jensen during the time period following his mother's 
death in February of 1993. Mrs. Jensen testified that she has 
paid money to those other third parties that David has 
periodically resided with for his support, specifically giving 
Tom Prentice $1,500.00 in September of 1993 for food and support 
provided to David. While Mrs. Jensen was unable to provide the 
Court with detailed information on the exact amount of funds she 
has expended in David's behalf, she estimated that she has 
expended approximately between $250.00 and $500.00 per month for 
David's needs, such as food, clothing, medical expenses, 
transportation costs, shelter, and other miscellaneous needs. 
Additionally, it is uncontroverted that David is currently 
receiving $233.00 per month entitlement from Social Security due 
to his mother's death. Mrs. Jensen testified that the Social 
Security benefit is deposited directly in David's own bank 
account and that he has been using those funds for recreation and 
miscellaneous needs. Mrs. Jensen further testifies that she has 
had no access to or control over the Social Security entitlement 
David receives and that those funds have not been used for 
David's care and support. The Court also heard testimony that 
David is not employed as defendant has alleged and has no other 
income separate from his Social Security entitlement. 
Additionally, the Court heard testimony from the defendant 
at the March 18, 1994 hearing as to his belief that monthly 
expenses attributable for the care and support of a seventeen 
year old boy such as David would be in the range of $500.00 per 
month. 
Although defendant is financially secure and capable of 
providing support for David, he maintains that the Social 
Security entitlement David receives should be factored in by the 
Court in determining defendant support obligation. Pursuant to 
U.C.A. §78-45-7.5(8)(a), such benefit to a child in the child's 
own right, may not be included in gross income for purposes of 
calculating child support. Thus, the Court will not offset 
defendant's support obligation with the Social Security death 
benefits David receives as a result of his mother's death. 
5. The Court, noting that defendant presently has two 
minor children with his present spouse for which he provides the 
sole support for, will allow defendant credit for his support 
obligation for those children. Thus, the Court will allow 
defendant a credit a $1,157.00 for his support obligation to his 
younger minor children pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.2(4)(a),(b), 
the Worksheet To Determine Father's Obligation To Children In His 
Present Home, and the Utah Uniform Child Support Obligation Table 
set forth in U.C.A. §78-45-7.14. (See Attachment A). 
Pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45-7.2(6), a difference of at least 
25% between the existing child support order and what the child 
support obligation would be under the Utah Uniform Child Support 
Guidelines utilizing the parties' current incomes constitutes a 
material change of circumstances that would justify the Court 
modifying an existing child support order. Thus, based upon 
defendant's gross monthly income of $7,008.52 and the $1,157.00 
credit for the children in his present home, the Court finds that 
a difference of more than 25% does exist between defendant's 
existing support obligation and what his support obligation would 
be under the present Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines. 
Court will order the modification retroactive to February 5, 
1993, the date of Janet Bowcutt Wing's death. 
Defendant is entitled to a credit against child support 
arrearages resulting from the retroactive modification for the 
$250.00 that he paid directly to Mrs. Jensen in November of 1993 
and for the amounts that have been deposited into Mr. Moody's 
trust account subsequent to the Court's previous Ruling issued 
November 24, 1993. The funds currently being held in Mr. Moody's 
trust account are to be turned over to Mrs. Jensen and an 
appropriate Judgement for any amounts in arrearage will be 
entered against the defendant and awarded to Mrs. Helen Jensen, 
Guardian and Conservator for David Charles Bowcutt. 
7. Pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals decision in 
Purfee v. Durfee. 796 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990), regarding the 
trial court's discretion to make such arrangements as may be 
required by the circumstances of a given case to ensure that a 
child receives the support ordered, the Court will order that 
defendant make the child support payment directly to Mrs. Helen 
Jensen, Guardian and Conservator for David Charles Bowcutt. 
Mrs. Jensen may disperse these funds to herself and other 
third parties, such as the Prentice family, with whom David has 
been residing with periodically and who are engaged in providing 
David with the care and support necessary for a seventeen year 
old boy. The Court further orders Mrs. Jensen to submit to the 
Court on a quarterly basis, a detailed accounting of how the 
child support award is being expended on David's behalf. 
($596.00 - $125.00 = $471.00 -5- $596.00 = .79%). Therefore, the 
Court will modify defendant's child support obligation for David 
Charles Bowcutt to $596.00 per month. (See Attachment B)• 
6. With regard to the issue of whether the modification of 
defendant's child support obligation should be retroactive to the 
date the State of Utah filed a Petition To Modify on June 11, 
1992 as Intervenor on behalf of the custodial parent, Janet 
Bowcutt Wing, who had sought public assistance for the minor 
child, the Court will refer to U.C.A. §30-3-10.6(2) which states: 
,fA child or spousal support payment under a child support 
order may be modified with respect to any period during 
which a petition for modification is pending, but only from 
the date notice of that petition was given to the obligee, 
if the obligator is the petitioner, or to the obligor, if 
the obligee is the petitioner." 
Although the Court would be inclined to make the modification of 
defendant's child support obligation retroactive to the date the 
State of Utah filed its Petition, the Court notes that no Return 
Of Service for defendant was ever filed in this matter, although 
plaintiff Janet Bowcutt Wing was served with the State Of Utah's 
Petition To Modify and an appropriate Return Of Service was 
filed. However, the Court notes that all parties involved in 
this matter, Mrs. Jensen, the defendant, and Mr. Wilkerson, the 
Guardian Ad Litem agreed at the March 18, 1994 hearing that any 
modification of the child support award should be made 
retroactive to the date of the custodial parent's death. 
Therefore, based upon that the parties' agreement as to when the 
modification of defendant's child support obligation should take 
effect presented to the Court at the March 18, 1994 hearing, the 
court ordered to do so, defendant will be responsible for all 
costs associated with such therapy for David Bowcutt. 
9. With regard to the issue of an award of attorney fees 
and costs in this matter, the Court notes that Mrs. Jensen filed 
an Affidavit In Support Of Attorney's Fees on or about March 18, 
1994 and defendant filed an Objection To Affidavit In Support Of 
Attorney Fees on or about March 25, 1994. 
The Court will refer to Lynale v. Lvnale. 831 P.2d 1027 
(Utah App. 1992), in which the Utah Court of Appeals stated that: 
f,In an action to enforce the provisions of a divorce decree, 
an award of attorney fees is based solely upon the trial 
court's discretion, regardless of the financial need of the 
moving party." 
In the above-entitled matter, Mrs. Jensen was forced to bring the 
defendant before this Court in order to obtain support for 
defendant's minor child. The Court, noting that defendant had 
previously taken the position that his support obligation was 
extinguished by the death of the custodial parent, believes the 
Mrs. Jensen had little choice in bringing this matter before the 
Court in order to obtain the support necessary for the minor 
child, David Bowcutt. Thus, upon review of the Affidavit In 
Support Of Attorney's Fees filed by Ms. Blakelock on or about 
March 18, 1994, the Court will elect to award Mrs. Jensen 
$1,000.00 in attorney fees and $105.00 for costs associated in 
pursuing this matter. Appropriate judgement against the 
defendant may be entered. 
Additionally, the Court would remind Mrs. Jensen that these funds 
are not to be turned over directly to David for use at his 
discretion. This child support award is to be used by Mrs. 
Jensen and the other third party care providers who are assisting 
Mrs. Jensen in providing a home for David for reimbursement for 
the reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in providing care, 
support, and a home for this minor child. Any remaining funds 
may be turned over to David upon him attaining majority. 
8. Additionally, the Court is gravely concerned over the 
emotional needs and well-being of this young man, David Bowcutt. 
The Court heard testimony from Mrs. Jensen, the defendant, and 
Mr. Wilkerson, David's Guardian Ad Litem at the March 18, 1994 
hearing that David is a young man who appears at times to be out 
of control, troubled, and in need of therapeutic assistance in 
helping deal with the trauma he has suffered as a result of the 
circumstances of his mother's death. The Court, noting that the 
parties are before him solely for the purpose of determining the 
child's needs and defendant's present income, does not have 
jurisdiction over this minor child and can not order David to 
participate in therapy. In the event that Mrs. Jensen, as 
David's Guardian, or Mr. Wilkerson, as David's Guardian Ad Litem, 
should determine that it would indeed be in David's best interest 
to seek therapeutic assistance, then they may refer the matter to 
Division of Family Services for an investigation and possible 
referral to the Juvenile Court. Regardless of whether David 
decides to participate in therapy voluntarily or is eventually 
•10. Counsel for Mrs. Jensen is directed to prepare an 
appropriate order consistent with the aforementioned ruling. 
DATED at Provo, Utah this <J- day of April, 1994 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Rosemond Blakelock 
Robert Moody 
Ron Wilkerson 
ATTACHMENT "B" 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
•IANCT SUE BOWCUTT 
vs. 
DON LESLIE BOWCUTT 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKS! 
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY 
rnnlNb. 784448131 
L Enter tfaecombined number of nansai and adopted children of this mother 
and father. 
2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly inrnmc. 
Refer to Instructions for definition of income. 7.008.52 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is nonntly paid. 
i (Do not enter alimony ordered Bar this case). 
2c. Enter previously ordered child suppon. (Do not enter oblignrinns 
ordered for the children in this case). 
2d. Optional: FTTTTT the amount from Line ra nf the rhflrfm iaPtwmgmi^ 
Worirshffigt far egfacr tmcirt. 1,157.00 fellllii 
3- SobczactLaie2b*2c%and2dfiom2aL This is die Adjusted Mowhiy 
Gross far child support purr* *^ *- 5,851 .52 I 5,85' 
4* Take the COMBINED fi^my is IT*1* 3 and the «»whw Q£ children in T m» 
1 to the Support Table, Find the Base Combined Support ObEgaaog, 59( 
5- Divide each parents adjusted monxhiyjross in line 3 by tbeCOMBINED 
adjusted monthtv gross in Line 3. 
6. MulnpiyUne4byIjne5£Dreadip8rentmobGun 
the Base Support Obligation, 
pai em's share of 
TBPB333DCQD3S PSX^L 0 0 1 
&• Ester the monthly WQCJC or 
the children in Line 1, 
traxnmc xeiaxeu cnuo firte 
9. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD 
Brum down the amount in Line 6 far the Obligor parent, 596.00 
10. Adjusted Base Guld Support Award 
Stibium the Obligor's r **** 7 ficom. TJnr 9, 
1L Adjusted Base Child Support Awani per Child 
Divide Line 10 by Line L 
12. CHILD CARE AWARD 
Multiply Line 8 by ,50 to obtain obligor's share of child care <m»j'»v Add to Line 10 only 
ATTACHMENT "A 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JANET SUE BOWCUTT 
vs. 
Don LESLIE BOWCUTT 
WORKSHEET TO DETERMINE FATHE 
OBUGATIONSTO CHILDREN IN HI 
PRESENT HOME 
Civil No. 784448131 
Current Spouse's Name 
1. Enter the number of natural and adopted children of the father and 
his current spouse in the home. 
2a. Enter the father's and his current spouses gross monthly income. 
See instructions for definition of income. 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony actually paid. 
(Do not enter alimony ordered for this case). 
2c. Enter pre-existing ordered child support. (Do not enter obligations 
ottered for the children in this case). 
3. Subtract l ine 2b and 2c from Line 2a. This is the Adjusted Monthly 
Gross for child support purposes. 
4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of children in Line 
1 to the Support Table. Find the Base Combined Support Obligation. 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by the COMBINED 
adjusted monthly gross in Line 3. 
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parent's share of 
ifae Base Support Obligation 
-0-
-0- % 
-0-
7. later the monthly uninsured medical expenses for the children in l ine i . 
8. Enter the monthly work or training related child care expenses for the 
the children in Line 1. 
7,008.52 
100 % 
7,008 
1,157 
w 
1,157.00 pspt**? 
ia-,i''vlr''*:"fiWi'<r~'v''**'r'* • • • ' • • - • - - ' v ' A " ' ' 1 " ' , > \ A V A ' - / | j i j - , - v - « -^v ' ' " v - - •'•;• 
*&*$<&&£• 
9. FATHER'S SHARE OF BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD FOR THE CHILDREN IN 
LINE L Enter the amount for the father from Line 6. 
10. FATHER'S SHARE OF UNINSURED MEDICAL EXPENSES OF THE CHILDREN 
IN LINE L Multiply the amount in Line 7 by a proposed ratio, and enter result here. 
11. FATHER'S SHARE OF WORK OR TRAINING RELATED CHILD CARE EXPENSE 
OF THE CHILDREN IN LINE 1. Multiply Line 8 by JO. and enter result here. 
12. FATHER'S SHARE OF TOTAL CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION TO THE 
CHILDREN IN LINE L Add Lines 9.10. and 11. This amount may be used to adjust the 
father's gross income on the sole, split or joint custody worksheets. 1,157.00 
ROSEMOND BLAKELOCK #6183 
BLAKELOCK AND STRINGER, P.A. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
37 East Center, 2nd Floor 
Provo, UT 84601 
Telephone: (801) 375-7678 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANET SUE BOWCUTT, : 
Plaintiff : 
vs. 
DON LESLIE BOWCUTT, : 
Defendant. 
: ORDER ON RULING: 
: CHILD SUPPORT 
: Case No. 784448131 
: Judge Steven L. Hansen 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on an Evidentiary Hearing 
regarding the Defendant's child support obligation for the parties7 
minor child, David Charles Bowcutt. Helen Jensen, maternal 
grandmother, Guardian and Conservator for the minor child, David 
Charles Bowcutt, was present and represented by Rosemond Blakelock. 
Defendant was present and represented by Robert Moody, Ron 
Wilkerson, Guardian Ad Litem for David Charles Bowcutt, was also 
present. At that time the court heard discussion and testimony 
regarding the Defendant's ability to provide support for the minor 
child and the minor child's status and needs for support and took 
the matter under advisement. 
Subsequently, the Court having reviewed the documentation, 
considered all the evidence, and being fully advised in the 
c-,r.Vi' 13 Frt't-W 
premises, issued Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law. 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law, 
the Court makes the following: 
ORDER 
1. The Court orders the consolidation of case number 
934402209, Case Number 93440310 and Case Number 784448131 
consolidated into one number, Case Number 784448131. All documents 
pertaining to this matter are to be filed under case Number 
784448131. 
2. The Court shall not offset the Defendant's support 
obligation with the Social Security death benefits the minor child 
David receives as a result of his mother's' death. 
3. Based upon the Defendant's gross monthly income of 
$7,008.52, and allowing a credit for the Defendant's obligations to 
children in his present home, the Court shall modify the 
Defendant's child support obligation for David Charles Bowcutt to 
$596.00 per month, retroactive to February 5, 1993, the date of 
Janet Bowctt Wings's death. 
4. Defendant shall be entitled to a credit against child 
support arrearages resulting from the retroactive modification for 
the $250.00 that was paid directly to Mrs. Jensen in November, 
1993, and credit for any amounts deposited into Mr, Moody's trust 
account subsequent to the Court's November 24, 1993 Ruling. 
5. The funds held in Mr. Moody's trust account shall be turned 
over to Mrs. Jensen. 
6. A Judgment shall be entered for the amount of $8,940.00 
($596 per month from February, 1993 through April, 1994) minus 
credit for $250.00 and a credit for the amount held in Mr. Moody's 
trust account. 
7. Future child support payments shall be made directly to 
Mrs. Helen Jensen, Guardian and Conservator for David Charles 
Bowcutt. 
8. Mrs. Jensen shall disperse these funds to herself and other 
third parties, such as the Prentice family, with whom David has 
been residing periodically and who are engaged in providing David 
with care and support. 
9. Mrs. Jensen shall submit to the Court on a quarterly basis, 
a detailed accounting of how the child support award is being 
expended on David's behalf. The first report due in August, 1994 
for the period of May through July, 1994. 
10. The child support funds shall not be turned over directly 
to David for his use at his discretion. If the funds are not used 
for ongoing support needs, they may be turned over to David upon 
his majority. 
11. Defendant shall be responsible for all costs associated 
with any therapy needs for David Bowcutt. 
12. Helen Jensen is awarded a judgment against the Defendant 
in the amount of $1,000.00 in attorney's fees and $105 in costs. 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
13. Judgment may be entered against Defendant for $1,105.00, 
for attorney's fees and costs. 
DATED AND EFFECTIVE this {JL day of li/UM ., 1994 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
:Jk^ 
Robert Mood Sftf 
4-504 NOTICE TO DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY 
TO: Robert Moody; 
You will please take notice that he undersigned attorney for 
Petitioner will submit the above and foregoing Order to the Court, 
for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of 
this Notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written 
objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of 
the Rules of Judicial Administration of the State of Utah. 
DATED this ^ day of fa z^ 1994. 
OSEMOND G. 2LOCK 
Attorney for Petitioner 
